I spent some time in the jungle, so it was interesting to read the Yahoo! "peanut butter" memo for an inside glimpse of another one of the Internet behemoths, draw a few unfounded conclusions, and make some comparisons. (The obligatory disclaimer here is that even when I did work for Amazon, I didn't speak for them, and I certainly don't do so now.)
A quick digression on peanut butter. I ate plenty of peanut butter growing up, although it was always Adam's. Jif, Skippy, and their ilk were rightfully regarded with some disdain because of the non-food substances (e.g., "fully hydrogenated vegetable oil") that they contain, but real peanut butter is generally good stuff food-wise: healthy oils, calorie-dense, high in protein.
My first observation about the letter was that reading it was a bit like a dog eating peanut butter. An SVP at an Internet major should be able to pound a diamond into dust in a few sentences. While a problem list is good fuel for an off-site or brainstorming session, information flows up the chain and direction flows down; put another way, there were a lot of nouns but not a lot of verbs in the memo.
My second observation was that I don't really think that Yahoo's doing so badly, even if the letter's factual in every respect. (See, e.g., this commentary for a "street-oriented" perspective.) I like to look at a metric that I'll call business-effectiveness of engineering ("BEE"), and it's computed as:
1-(revenue(t)/revenue(t-Delta))
B(t) = -------------------------------
1-(cost(t)/cost(t-Delta))
for some time range Delta, e.g., a year or other financial reporting period. Taking the numbers from SEC filings by Google, Amazon, and Yahoo:
| Symbol | 2004 BEE | 2005 BEE | 3Q2006 BEE |
| AMZN |
3.10 |
0.37 |
0.57 |
| GOOG |
0.88 |
0.80 |
0.92 |
| YHOO |
1.56 |
0.97 |
0.50 |
The 3Q2006 number is computed versus the 3Q2005 number. I've pulled numbers from the financial roll-ups in the 2005 10-K (AMZN, GOOG, YHOO) and 3Q2006 10-Q filings (AMZN, GOOG, YHOO). (I should add eBay to the list, but maybe later; for comparison, their BEE for 3Q2006 is 0.91. Salesforce.com has a 3Q2006 BEE of 0.82.)
The numbers suggest that Yahoo's and Amazon's core business models, vis à vis their ability to execute in terms technology and engineering, are essentially at end of life, since it costs $0.50 of engineering labor to buy $1.00 of revenue. (Yahoo is profitable and could afford to spend significantly on growth if the raw materials (i.e., smart people) are available in sufficient supply; Amazon has less fiscal wiggle room.) This shouldn't be surprising — it takes a lot of software to run a big Internet business, and there's a pretty good chance that not all of it was written by top-notch folks working under clean-room conditions... That said, Amazon is trying to leverage its core expertise in operating its server fleet (and they are very good at it) into new lines of business (S3, EC2, etc.), and all three have been rolling-up customers, partners, or players in their respective spaces: Amazon is consolidating online retail, Yahoo is consolidating social and personal software, and Google is consolidating the on-line advertising business.
The prescription for Yahoo seems simple enough:
- Consolidate. Keep the peanuts and salt but flush any fillers that accumulated after the last bust.
- Avoid a money fight with Google by innovating from within, strategic investing, or grabbing properties early. (Not buying YouTube was a miss; knowing that video sharing was hot and not already having or owning a hunk of a parallel property is a bigger miss.)
- Ensure that offerings are readily identifiable and usable by regular folks. Having two photo sharing services isn't a sin, but having any difficult to use, locate, or understand services is.
- Use social context (rather than keyword inference) to target advertising.
As for just how to do it, since I'm not an SVP at Yahoo, I'm not on the hook for that part...